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Marriage Equality and Obergefell’s Generational (Not
Glucksberg’s Traditional) Due Process Clause
RONALD TURNER*
“Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the ages
and generation which preceded it.”1
INTRODUCTION
In its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges2 the United States Supreme
Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that “the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person,”3 and that state laws depriving same-sex couples of
that right and liberty violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4
Much will be written in the coming months and years about the Court’s
decision and the views expressed and positions taken in the majority and
dissenting opinions. This essay focuses on one aspect of Obergefell: the majority’s
and dissents’ differing interpretations and applications of the Due Process
Clause. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s opinion for the Court is an exemplar of
due process generationalism. Under that methodology, the meaning and scope of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause is discerned and defined, not by
those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, but by “future
generations . . . protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning.”5 Rejecting that approach, the dissenting Justices employed due process
traditionalism, a methodology in which the Due Process Clause is interpreted in
accordance with the nation’s deeply rooted and long-standing traditions and
history.6 As discussed herein, Obergefell’s generational liberty protects a same-sex
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1. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), reprinted in THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 243, 251 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1974).
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. Id. at 2604.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
5. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
6. For extended discussions of due process traditionalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process
Traditionalism, 106 MICH L. REV. 1543 (2008). See also Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and
Discretionary Traditionalism, 66 SMU L. REV. 841 (2013); Ronald Turner, Same-Sex Marriage and Due
Process Traditionalism, 49 U. RICH L. REV. 579 (2015).
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couple’s right to marry; that right would not be recognized under a liberty
principle grounded in and defined solely by reference to tradition.
I.DUE PROCESS TRADITIONALISM
Tradition7 and history have long been referenced in the Court’s and
individual Justices’ interpretation and application of constitutional provisions.8
Grounded in Burkean notions of and respect for tradition,9 legal traditionalism

7. What counts as a, or the, pertinent tradition is itself an important and foundational question,
for “judges must make controversial claims in order to ascertain what counts as ‘American
tradition.’” CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 141 (2007). As John Hart
Ely remarked, “‘tradition’ can be invoked in support of almost any cause.” JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 60 (1980). He stated:
There is obvious room to maneuver, along continua of both space and time, on the subject
of which tradition to invoke. Whose traditions count? America’s only? Why not the entire
world’s? . . . And what is the relevant time frame? All of history? Anteconstitutional history
only? Prior to the ratification of the provision whose construction is in issue? . . . Is Henry
David Thoreau an invocable part of American tradition? John Brown? John Calhoun? Jesus
Christ? It’s hard to see why not.
Id. at 60; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
119 (1990) (“The judge who states that tradition and morality are his guides . . . leaves himself free to
pick through them for those particular freedoms that he prefers. History and traditions are very
capacious suitcases, and a judge may find a good deal pleasing to himself packed into them, if only
because he has packed the bags himself.”).
8. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“The
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing the household along with
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional
recognition.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–41 (1973) (examining ancient attitudes, the origins of
the Hippocratic Oath, common law, English statutory law, and state laws); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (the state unsuccessfully argued that anti-miscegenation laws were not unconstitutional
because “for over 100 years, since the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, numerous states”
prohibited interracial marriages “without any question being raised as to the authority of the state to
exercise this power” (Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 41, Loving v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 1
(1967) (No. 395))); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (marriage is “older than the Bill
of Rights”); id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (in deciding cases judges “must look to the ‘traditions
and (collective) conscience’ of our people”) (citation omitted); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (due process cannot be reduced to a formula and is a “balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as
the traditions from which it broke.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (due process
liberty includes the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” and “the American
people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme
importance which should be diligently promoted.”); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420–21 (1908)
(constitutional questions “are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion” where there
is a debate over an issue of fact and “the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long
continued belief concerning it is worthy of consideration.”); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550
(1896) (the question of the constitutionality of state-mandated racial segregation is to be answered by
“reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people”); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
130, 140 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court’s holding that Illinois
constitutionally denied a married woman the right to practice law, Bradley stated that under the
common law “only men were admitted to the bar, and the legislature had not made any change in
this respect”); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (declaring that African slaves
and their descendants were not citizens under the Constitution and relying on “the legislation and
histories of the times” and “the public history of every European nation”).
9. The English writer and politician Edmund Burke cautioned that current generations should
not ignore the past,
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posits that the Constitution should be interpreted “in accordance with the longstanding and evolving practices, experiences, and traditions of the nation,”10 and
considers authoritative and binding the words of the document “as they have
been understood by the people over the course of our constitutional history, from
enactment through the present.”11
Due process traditionalism has been applied by the Court in substantive
due process cases challenging government prohibitions of certain conduct by
individuals. Consider Bowers v. Hardwick12 wherein the Court rejected a
substantive due process challenge to a Georgia law criminalizing so-called
“homosexual sodomy.” Justice Byron Raymond White’s opinion for a five-Justice
Court majority13 framed the issue for resolution as follows: “whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many States that still make such
conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.”14 Answering that
question in the negative, Justice White noted that sodomy proscriptions “have
ancient roots” and that sodomy was a common-law offense prohibited by the
original thirteen states at the time of the 1791 ratification of the Bill of Rights;15
that “all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws” in 1868,
the year of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment;16 and that “until 1961, all
50 States outlawed sodomy, and today 24 States and the District of Columbia
continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and

lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of what they have received
from their ancestors, or of what is due to their posterity, should act as if they were the
entire masters; that they should not think it amongst their rights to cut off the entail, or
commit waste on the inheritance, by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric
of society.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 192 (Conor Cruise O’Brien ed.,
Penguin Books 1969) (1790).
Burke believed that there was an unbroken chain linking ancestors to the living and “a
partnership . . . between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.”
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 85 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co. 1987) (1790). Interestingly, David Bromwich posits that in this passage Burke “offered his vision
of a society rooted in trust,” and that Burke “believed that the advent of democracy would destroy
the very idea of a human partnership spread out over generations.” DAVID BROMWICH, THE
INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE: FROM THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL TO AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE 4–5 (2014).
It should be noted that Burke did not “develop an account of judicial review. English courts
lacked (and lack) the power to strike down legislation, and hence it could not possibly have occurred
to Burke to explore the nature and limits of that power.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSONAE 84 (2015).
10. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127,
1133 (1998).
11. Id. at 1133–36.
12. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
13. Following his retirement from the Court, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., one of the five Justices
comprising the Bowers majority, stated that he “probably made a mistake” when he voted to uphold
the Georgia law. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 530 (1994).
14. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
15. Id. at 192.
16. Id. at 193.
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between consenting adults.”17 “Against this background,” he concluded, “to
claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best,
facetious.”18
The dissenting Justices in Bowers rejected the Court’s traditional-thereforeconstitutional holding. Justice Harry A. Blackmun criticized the view that “either
the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which
it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s scrutiny.”19 He
quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes: “‘[I]t is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.’”20 In his separate
dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that “the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional
attack.”21 He called for recognition of a different tradition: one “of respect for the
dignity of individual choice in matters of conscience . . . .”22
A subsequent decision, Washington v. Glucksberg,23 involved a challenge to a
Washington state law prohibiting assisted suicide. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist began his analysis with an examination of this
country’s history, legal traditions, and practices. “In almost every State—indeed,
in almost every Western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide.”24 He set
out various indicators of what he deemed to be the pertinent tradition: AngloAmerican common law tradition punished or disapproved of suicide and
assisted suicide for more than 700 years; the American colonies adopted that
common-law approach, as did early state legislatures and courts; a New York
law enacted in 1828 outlawed assisted suicide, and other states followed suit; in
the twentieth century, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code
prohibited aiding suicide; and states “are currently engaged in serious,
thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues.”25
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that “[a]ttitudes toward suicide itself have
changed”26 since Henry de Bracton’s 13th-century observation that “just as a man
may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by slaying himself.”27 But
17. Id.
18. Id. at 194; see also id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“To hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral
teaching.”).
19. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 199 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897)).
21. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 217.
23. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
24. Id. at 710.
25. Id. at 719.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 711 (brackets omitted) (quoting HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND 423 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (c. 1235)).
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that change did not render the asserted right fundamental, as “our laws have
consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide . . . Against
this backdrop of history, tradition, and practice,” the Court turned to the
challenge to the Washington law.28
Chief Justice Rehnquist then set out the elements of the Court’s
traditionalist substantive due process inquiry and analysis:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects
those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Second,
we have required in substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.29

Taking up the careful description step of the analysis, the Chief Justice
framed the question before the Court as follows: “whether the ‘liberty’ specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which
itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”30 Turning to the tradition
inquiry, he asked whether the asserted right was deeply rooted. No, he
answered, for there was
a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted
right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally
competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries
of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of
almost every State.31

Chief Justice Rehnquist thus concluded that the history of the legal
treatment of assisted suicide in the United States “has been and continues to be
one of rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it.”32 Accordingly, the claimed right
was not fundamental, and the Court determined that the assisted-suicide ban
was rationally related to legitimate governmental interests.33

28. Id. at 719.
29. Id. at 720–21 (citing Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922)).
30. Id. at 723 (footnote omitted). Those challenging the statute posed a different question:
whether the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the “‘liberty of
competent, terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions free of undue governmental
interference.’” Id. at 724 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 10, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997) (No. 96-110)); see also id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring) (rejecting the Court’s formulation of the
asserted liberty interest and proposing a “right to die with dignity” approach).
31. Id. at 723; see also id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ur Nation’s history, legal
traditions, and practices do not support the existence” of a protected right to suicide); id. at 740
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“History and tradition provide ample support for refusing to recognize an
open-ended constitutional right to commit suicide.”).
32. Id. at 728.
33. See id. at 728–35 (stating “the asserted legal ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause” and “the law at issue is at least
reasonably related to [legitimate governmental interests]”); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–
09 (1997) (holding that a New York law prohibiting assisted suicide did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
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***
In Glucksberg and Bowers the Court looked to tradition and history, not just
for potentially relevant information concerning past views and practices, but for
supposedly discoverable and dispositive answers to the modern legal questions
presented in those cases. Due process traditionalism looks back to centuries-old
common law traditions, to colonial times, to 1791 when the Bill of Rights was
ratified, to the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and to past and
current state laws addressing and prohibiting certain activity and conduct.
Under this approach, the operative tradition(s) governing the resolution of a
constitutional question are old(er), and established laws and practices supporting
the continuation of the legal status quo.
Where tradition-as-authority governs constitutional interpretation, the
question whether a challenged practice or prohibition is “good” or “bad” or
positive or malevolent is not at issue.34 Challenged laws and practices are left in
place, including the discriminatory and noxious state mandate before the Court
in Bowers. Consequently, individuals regulated and even denigrated by certain
traditional and state-sanctioned practices and beliefs are unable to obtain judicial
relief from jurists who believe that a claimed right not deeply rooted in tradition
and history is not protected by the Constitution.
II. DUE PROCESS GENERATIONALISM
Due process traditionalism was not the favored interpretative approach in
substantive due process cases decided before and after Glucksberg. In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey35 a joint opinion authored by
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David H. Souter
reaffirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade.36 The trio observed that it was
“tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those
practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against
governmental interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.”37 They resisted that temptation: “Neither the Bill of
Rights nor the specific practices of the States at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limit of the substantive sphere of liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”38 Liberty involves “the most
intimate matters and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy”39 and includes “the right to define
34.

As Judge Richard A. Posner recently noted:

Tradition per se has no positive or negative significance. There are good traditions, bad
traditions pilloried in such famous literary stories as Franz Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony”
and Shirley Jackson’s “The Lottery,” bad traditions that are historical realities such as
cannibalism, foot-binding, and suttee, and traditions that from a public-policy standpoint
are neither good nor bad (such as trick-or-treating on Halloween).
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 2014).
35. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that “the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision”).
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
38. Id. at 848.
39. Id. at 851.
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one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under the compulsion of the State.”40
Having rejected the liberty-limiting traditionalist position, the joint opinion
proclaimed that the Constitution is an aspirational document belonging to each
generation of Americans:
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to
us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation
must learn anew that the Constitution’s written terms embody ideas and
aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility
not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all our
precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution’s own promise, the promise of liberty.41

Chief Justice Rehnquist’s four-Justice and traditionalist dissent, calling for
the overruling of Roe, argued that “the historical traditions of the American
people” did not “support the view that the right to terminate one’s pregnancy is
‘fundamental.’”42 And in a separate dissent Justice Antonin Scalia, approvingly
citing Bowers v. Hardwick,43 stated that abortion, “homosexual sodomy,
polygamy, adult incest, and suicide . . . can constitutionally be proscribed
because it is our unquestionable tradition that they are proscribable.”44
Now consider the Court’s post-Glucksberg analysis in the historic Lawrence v.
Texas decision.45 There, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, struck down a Texas statute
criminalizing “‘deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex.’”46 Justice Kennedy, a member of the Glucksberg majority, authored a
majority opinion that made no reference to Glucksberg. He opened the opinion
with this conception of constitutionally protected liberty:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusion into a
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in
the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the
home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimension.47

Framing the issue before the Court, Justice Kennedy asked “whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of

40. Id.
41. Id. at 901.
42. Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 952–53 (“[I]t can scarcely be said that any
deeply rooted tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classification
of the right to abortion as ‘fundamental’ under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
43. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44. Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
46. Id. at 563 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 2003)).
47. Id. at 562.
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their liberty under the Due Process Clause.”48 He noted that in Bowers v. Hardwick
the Court asked whether there was a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy.49 That formulation of the issue “discloses the Court’s own failure to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake” and “demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
that marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”50
Justice Kennedy rejected the history and tradition relied on in Bowers as
doubtful and “overstated.”51 In his view, anti-sodomy laws did not have
“‘ancient roots,’” there was no “longstanding history in this country of laws
directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter,” and “early American
sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to
prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally.”52 Also significant was
the absence of a record of enforcement of anti-sodomy laws against consenting
adults engaging in private sexual activities. Applying a desuetude analysis,53
Justice Kennedy reasoned that infrequent prosecutions made “it difficult to say
that society approved of a rigorous and systematic punishment” of such
activity.54 He noted, in addition, that same-sex sexual intimacies were not
targeted prior to the latter third of the twentieth century; that state laws
criminalizing such activity did not occur before the 1970s; and that only nine
states prohibited the conduct at the time of the Court’s 2003 decision.55
Having questioned the bases for and the accuracy of the Bowers Court’s
analysis, Justice Kennedy made clear his view that “‘[h]istory and tradition are
the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry.’”56 He agreed with the following passage in Justice Stevens’
Bowers dissent: “‘[T]he fact that a governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting that practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.’”57
As can be seen, Justice Kennedy did not look back to and stop at the colonial
era, 1791, and 1868. He focused instead on “our laws and traditions in the past
half century” and found therein evidence of “an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”58 In his view, the holding in Bowers was
rendered even more doubtful by the Court’s subsequent decision in Casey,
wherein the Court “confirmed that our laws and traditions afford constitutional

48. Id. at 564.
49. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
50. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 571.
52. Id. at 567–68.
53. Desuetude doctrine “forbids the use of old laws lacking current public support, to require
more in the way of accountability and deliberation.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1999).
54. Lawrence, 539 U.S at 569–70.
55. See id. at 570
56. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
58. Id. at 571–72; see also id. at 572–73 (discussing indicators of the “emerging awareness”).
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protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.”59 Accordingly, “Bowers was
not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”60
Concluding, that the Texas law at issue was unconstitutional, the Court’s opinion
made clear that the case did not involve the question “whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek
to enter.”61
Further, and importantly, the penultimate paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s
opinion set out a generational approach to an understanding of the Due Process
Clause:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations
can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.62

The twenty-first century question raised in the challenge to the Texas
“deviate sexual intercourse” statute was not answered by reference to and
reliance on the laws of 1791 and 1868 or the 1960s. Traditional views do not and
should not bind later generations, Justice Kennedy declared, as the “components
of liberty” are not limited to the vision and understanding of those who framed
and ratified the Due Process Clause. Due process generationalism, and not a
traditional-therefore-constitutional approach, governed the Court’s analysis as it
invalidated Texas’s criminalization of private and consensual sexual intimacies
engaged in by persons of the same sex.
Justice Scalia’s vigorous dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas, noted “the Court’s surprising readiness to reconsider a
decision rendered a mere 17 years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick.”63 Citing Glucksberg,
he opined “that the Due Process Clause prohibits States from infringing
fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.”64 Fundamental rights—”that is, rights which are
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”65—qualify for this insulation
from state infringement. Justice Scalia argued that Bowers correctly held that a
59. Id. at 574. Justice Kennedy also noted that in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court
upheld an Equal Protection Clause challenge to an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that
prohibited legislative, executive, or judicial actions at the state or local government level designed to
prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.
60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
61. Id. at 578. Nor did the case involve minors, persons unable to give consent to sexual conduct,
or prostitution or public conduct. See id.
62. Id. at 578–79. “In other words, persons in every generation can seek to realize the
Constitution’s promise of liberty.” JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR
MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 59 (2015).
63. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 593.
65. Id.
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right to engage in homosexual sodomy was not so deeply rooted, as “our Nation
has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general— regardless of
whether it was performed by same-sex or opposite-sex couples.”66 (This
reference to “sodomy in general” is a departure from Justice Scalia’s earlier
stated position that a relevant tradition must be identified at its most specific
level so as to avoid the “imprecise guidance” provided by “general traditions.”)67
In addition, Justice Scalia argued that the “emerging awareness” identified
by the Court “is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition[s],’ as we have said ‘fundamental right’ status requires. Constitutional
entitlements do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or
eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior.”68 Nor did he believe Justice
Kennedy’s assurance that the Court’s ruling did not involve or decide the issue
of whether government must formally recognize any relationship homosexual
persons sought to enter.69 In his view, the Court’s opinion “dismantles the
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in
marriage is concerned.”70 As for Justice Kennedy’s due process generationalism,
Justice Scalia agreed that later generations can see that laws believed at one time
to be necessary and proper can at later times oppress individuals.71 “[W]hen that
happens, later generations can repeal those laws. But it is the premise of our
system that those judgments are to be made by the people, and not imposed by a
governing caste that knows best.”72
In repudiating Bowers’ due process traditionalism, Lawrence did not even
cite Glucksberg, an interesting omission given Bowers’ and Glucksberg’s shared
views regarding the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause.73
Did Glucksberg survive Lawrence?74 The Court’s 2003 decision made no such

66. Id. at 596.
67. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion). In that case Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, set forth a specific methodology governing the identification
of the pertinent and applicable tradition in substantive due process cases. “We refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can
be identified.” Id. Identifying the most specific tradition is necessary, in his view, because “general
traditions provide such imprecise guidance . . . [and] permit judges to dictate rather than discern the
society’s views.” Id.
Interestingly, Justice O’Connor did not agree with Justice Scalia’s approach. In a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Kennedy she argued that Scalia’s method “sketches a mode of historical
analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause . . . that
may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area.” Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part). Noting that the Court had previously characterized right-protecting traditions at
“levels of generality that might not be ‘the most specific level available,’” she declined to “foreclose
the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.” Id.
68. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 578.
70. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 603.
72. Id. at 603–04.
73. See generally Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since
Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 410 (2006).
74. See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life
and Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2008) (discussing Lawrence’s more expansive take on
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proclamation. Was Glucksberg limiting post-Lawrence to the specific issue decided
by the Court’s 1997 ruling, the claimed right to commit suicide with another
person’s assistance? The answer to that question at the time of the Lawrence
decision was by no means clear. What can be said with assurance is that
Lawrence’s due process generationalism, applied in the context of a challenge to a
law discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, invalidated the traditionbased and discriminatory status quo.
In its 2013 United States v. Windsor75 decision the Court, in yet another 5-4
ruling, held that the federal government violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause76 when it denied an estate tax refund to Edith Windsor, the
surviving spouse of a same-sex marriage sanctioned by the state of New York.77
That marriage was not recognized by the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA). DOMA defined “marriage” as “a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife” and “spouse” as “a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.”78
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court (joined by Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) noted that as a
matter of history and tradition, the regulation of domestic relations “has long
been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”79 Defining
marriage “is the foundation of the State’s broader authority to regulate the
subject of domestic relations with respect to ‘the [p]rotection of offspring,
property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.’”80 From the
beginning, this nation’s legal governance of the domestic relationship between
husband, wife, and child has been a state, not a federal, matter.
DOMA “departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to
define marriage,” Justice Kennedy stated, and “use[d] the state defined class for
the opposite purpose—to impose restrictions and disabilities.”81 DOMA sought
“to injure the very class New York seeks to protect,”82 and the statute’s “unusual
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions
of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages.”83 The
statute thus interfered “with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity
conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power.”84 Because of
substantive due process and whether Glucksberg can be reconciled with this take).
75. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
77. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682 (“The State of New York recognizes the marriage of New York
residents Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer who wed in Ontario.”).
78. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
79. See 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
80. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 2692.
82. Id. at 2693.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL: THE STORY OF
HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY 263 (2015) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s Windsor opinion “made almost a
dozen references to the ‘dignity’ of gay individuals” and is “a case about the dignity of gay people,
which would mean that all states would have to provide marriage equality to respect that dignity”).
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DOMA, the state-sanctioned marriage of a same-sex couple was treated as a
“second-tier marriage,” and tens of thousands of children raised by same-sex
couples were humiliated and financially harmed.85 Justice Kennedy concluded
that the law’s purpose and effect demeaned persons in lawful same-sex
marriages and therefore violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process and equal
protection principles.86 In so holding, Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[t]his
opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.”87
Invoking Glucksberg, a dissenting Justice Scalia argued that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion did not contend that same-sex marriage is deeply rooted in
this nation’s tradition and history. Such a claim “would of course be quite
absurd” as would “the further suggestion (also necessary, under our substantivedue-process precedents) that a world in which DOMA exists is bereft of ‘ordered
liberty.’”88 Pointing to Justice Kennedy’s statement that the Court’s opinion and
holding were confined to same-sex marriages sanctioned by state law, Justice
Scalia said that he had “heard such bald, unreasoned disclaimers before” in
Lawrence.89 He continued:
It takes real cheek for today’s majority to assure us . . . that a constitutional
requirement to give formal recognition to same-sex marriage is not at issue
here— when what has preceded that assurance is a lecture on how superior the
majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is to the Congress’s
hateful moral judgment against it. I promise you this: The only thing that will
“confine” the Court’s holding is its sense of what it can get away with.90

Justice Alito, dissenting separately, grounded his argument in Glucksberg.
Arguing that the right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this nation’s
history and tradition, he stated that same-sex marriages had not been permitted
by a state prior to a 2003 decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,91
and that in 2000, the Netherlands was the first country to allow such marriages.92
In his view, Windsor and the United States seek “from unelected judges” “not
the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new right”
which should come from legislatures elected by the people.93 Positing two
competing views of marriage—(1) “traditional” or “conjugal” marriage and (2)
“consent-based” marriage94—Justice Alito said that the Constitution does not
codify either view (though he suspected that “it would have been hard at the

85. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–95.
86. See id. at 2695.
87. Id. at 2696.
88. Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 2709 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604
(2003).
90. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. See Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
92. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. For Justice Alito, “traditional” or “conjugal” marriage “sees marriage as an intrinsically
opposite-sex institution” that was “created for the purpose of channeling heterosexual intercourse
into a structure that supports child rearing.” Id. at 2718. “Consent-based” marriage “primarily defines
marriage as the solemnization of mutual commitment—marked by strong emotional attachment and
sexual attraction—between two persons.” Id.
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time of the adoption of the Constitution or the Fifth Amendment to find
Americans who did not take the traditional view for granted”).95 Given this
constitutional silence, he “would not presume to enshrine either vision of
marriage in our constitutional jurisprudence.”96
***
On display in the Court’s pre- and post-Glucksberg decisions in Casey,
Lawrence, and Windsor are debates over generational and traditional
interpretations, and applications of the Due Process Clause. The Casey joint
opinion declared that the promise of liberty is generational and aspirational, and
is not limited to or by traditional views and practices. Lawrence overruled and
interred the Court’s traditionalist decision in Bowers. In doing so, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court called for a generational approach to the Due
Process Clause that does not hermetically seal and insulate from constitutional
challenge tradition-based and discriminatory legal commands. On that view,
certain laws must give way when later generations conclude, and the Court
determines, that what was once constitutionally acceptable is now
constitutionally unacceptable. Tradition qua tradition was not a justificatory
ground for discrimination97 and did not foreclose the invocation of generational
due process principles by those challenging the criminalization of same-sex
sexual intimacies.
Nor was Glucksberg traditionalism applied by a majority of the Court in
Windsor. There, the Court relied on the history and tradition of states’ definition
of marriage and states’ regulation of domestic relations as support for its holding
that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment. In referencing and employing
tradition in this way, the Court did not contend, as did Justices Scalia and Alito,
that same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition,
for the issue of the due process fundamentality of the right to marry a person of
the same sex was not before the Court. The Court considered that issue in
Obergefell.
III.OBERGEFELL
In Obergefell v. Hodges98 the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that “the
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment same-sex couples may not be deprived of that right and that
liberty.”99 In striking down state anti-same-sex-marriage laws, the Court defined

95. Id.
96. Id. at 2719.
97. See Baskin v. Bogan 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Tradition per se . . . cannot be a lawful
ground for discrimination–regardless of the age of the tradition.”).
98. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
99. Id. at 2604. The Court discussed four principles demonstrating the fundamentality of
marriage between persons of the same sex. First, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.” Id. at 2599. Second, “the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the
committed individuals.” Id.at 2589. Third, “the right to marry . . . safeguards children and families

Turner Final Macro to PDF (Do Not Delete)

158 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

4/15/2016 11:36 AM

Volume 23:145 2016

and comprehended liberty in generational and contemporary terms and
pointedly rejected Glucksberg’s traditionalist approach to and narrow
interpretation of the Due Process Clause.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for a five-Justice Court majority100 concentrated
on the history and “transcendent importance of marriage,” an institution
“essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”101 “The lifelong union of
a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons,
without regard to their station in life.”102 Both continuous and changing, the
history of marriage—”even as confined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved
over time.”103 From marriages arranged by parents, to contracts between a man
and a woman, to and beyond the law of coverture, “developments in the
institution of marriage over the past centuries were not mere superficial changes.
Rather, they worked deep transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of
marriage long viewed by many as essential.”104 These developments have
strengthened and not weakened marriage, Justice Kennedy opined, as “new
dimensions of freedom became apparent to new generations.”105
Turning to the lives and rights of gays and lesbians, Justice Kennedy noted
that prior to the mid-20th century same-sex intimacy was deemed immoral and
often criminalized, and that for much of the 20th century homosexuality was
treated as an illness.106 Political and cultural developments in the late 20th century
challenged those views—views reflected in laws that overtly discriminated on
the basis of sexual orientation—and “same-sex couples began to lead more open
and public lives and to establish families.”107 The issue of gay rights was
discussed throughout a nation showing a greater tolerance towards gays and
lesbians.108
The issue of and debate over the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians
ultimately reached the courts. Justice Kennedy noted the Supreme Court’s
rulings in this area: Bowers v. Hardwick,109 Romer v. Evans,110 Lawrence v. Texas,111

and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.” Id. at 2600.
Fourth, “marriage is a keystone of our social order” and states “have contributed to the fundamental
character of the marriage right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the legal
and social order.” Id. at 2601.
100. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at 2591.
101. Id. at 2594.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2595.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2596.
106. See id. (“Same-sex intimacy remained a crime in many States . . . [and] homosexuality was
treated as an illness.”).
107. Id.
108. See id. (“This development was followed by a quite extensive discussion of the issue in both
governmental and private sectors and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater tolerance.”).
109. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
110. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down an amendment to the Colorado
constitution forbidding the enactment of measures outlawing sexual orientation discrimination by
that state’s branches and political subdivisions).
111. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

Turner Final Macro to PDF (Do Not Delete)

4/15/2016 11:36 AM

OBERGEFELL’S GENERATIONAL DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

159

and United States v. Windsor.112 The legality of same-sex marriage prohibitions
was also addressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court in a 1993 decision holding that
that state’s law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples was a sex-based
classification subject to strict scrutiny judicial review under the Hawaii
Constitution.113 Ten years later, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,114 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, guided by Lawrence, held that same-sex
couples’ right to marry was protected by that state’s constitution.
Justice Kennedy instructed that the identification and protection of
fundamental rights “requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying
interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its
respect. That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to
an analysis of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles
rather than specific requirements.”115 In his view, two of those considerations,
history and tradition, are relevant but not determinative. “History and tradition
guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. . . . That
method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to
rule the present.”116 He again called for a generational interpretation of the Due
Process Clause:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The
generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the
right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight
reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received
legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.117

While the “limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have
seemed natural and just,” said the Justice, “its inconsistency with the central
meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest” and it must be
recognized that same-sex marriage bans “impose stigma and injury of the kind
prohibited by our basic charter.”118
Relying on Glucksberg, the state-defendants argued that the Court was being
asked to recognize, not the right to marry, but “a new and nonexistent ‘right to
same-sex marriage.’”119 Justice Kennedy agreed that Glucksberg insisted that the
definition of due process liberty must be circumscribed “with central reference to
specific historical practices.”120 In a significant move, however, he limited the
Glucksberg analysis to the right asserted in that case: the right to physicianassisted suicide. While the Glucksberg approach was appropriate in that context,

112.
113.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW.
CONST. art. I, § 23.
114. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
115. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2602.
119. Id. (citation omitted).
120. Id.
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he argued, it was inconsistent with the approach the Court has taken in other
cases discussing fundamental rights in general and marriage and intimacy in
particular. Loving v. Virginia121 did not ask whether there was a right to
interracial marriage; Turner v. Safley122 did not ask whether inmates had the right
to marry; and Zablocki v. Redhail123 did not “ask about a ‘right of fathers with
unpaid child support duties to marry.’”124 In those cases the Court “inquired
about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.”125 If that
approach was not followed and applied to the marriage equality issue and
“rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices
could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not
invoke rights once denied.”126
The four dissenting Justices rejected Justice Kennedy’s generationalist
analysis. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
argued that in jettisoning Glucksberg’s careful approach to implied fundamental
rights the Court effectively overruled “the leading modern case setting the
bounds of substantive due process.”127 The Chief Justice agreed with Justice
Kennedy that proper reliance on history and tradition requires one to look
beyond the particular law being challenged “so that every restriction on liberty
does not supply its own constitutional justification.”128 Even so, he continued,
history and tradition impose meaningful limits on the judiciary and insure
judicial restraint. “Expanding a right suddenly and dramatically is likely to
require tearing it up from its roots.”129 The majority “not only overlooks our
country’s entire history and tradition but actively repudiates it, preferring to live
only in the heady days of the here and now.”130 And, while agreeing again with
Justice Kennedy that we may not always be able to see injustice “in our own
times,”131 Roberts remarked, “But to blind yourself to history is both prideful and
unwise. ‘The past is never dead. It’s not even past.’”132
Justice Scalia’s separate dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the
Court had no basis for invalidating the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex
couples, a practice endorsed by “a long tradition of open, widespread, and
unchallenged use dating back to the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s ratification” and
not explicitly proscribed by that provision’s text.133 Noting Justice Kennedy’s
121. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
122. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
123. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
124. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2620–21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2618.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2623.
131. See id. at 2598.
132. Id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92
(1951)).
133. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). (“When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868,
every State limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the constitutionality of
doing so. That resolves these cases.”).
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observation that the generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment “did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of
its dimensions,”134 Justice Scalia would have added the following language to
that sentence: “and therefore they provided for a means by which the People
could amend the Constitution,” or “therefore they left the creation of additional
liberties, such as the freedom to marry someone of the same sex, to the People,
through the never-ending process of legislation.”135 Justice Scalia complained
that the majority’s judge-empowering opinion left to future generations the task
of “protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.
The ‘we,’ needless to say, is the nine of us.”136
Like his dissenting colleagues, Justice Alito argued that it is beyond dispute
that a right to same-sex marriage is not a right deeply rooted in this nation’s
history and tradition. The Glucksberg methodology sought to “prevent five
unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon the
American people.”137 In his view, it did not matter to the majority “that the right
to same-sex marriage lacks deep roots or even that it is contrary to longestablished tradition.”138 Five Justices recognized and “confer[red] constitutional
protection upon that right simply because they believe that it is fundamental.”139
Obergefell is a clear defeat for the Court’s due process traditionalists.
Declining to limit substantive due process protection only to rights with a
traditional pedigree, Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion, continued down
the jurisprudential path marked by Lawrence and Casey. He described the
institution of marriage as an evolving and not static institution. He noted the
trajectory of societal and legal developments concerning the lives, lived
experiences, and rights of gays and lesbians from earlier times of posited
immorality and criminalization to the present day in which the nation exhibits
greater tolerance towards gays and lesbians and in which same-sex couples are
better able to live open and public lives. The history and tradition of marriage
between one man and one woman, while relevant, did not dispositively answer
the contemporary question of whether same-sex marriage bans violate the Due
Process Clause. For the Obergefell Court, the answer to that question was not
found in a traditional and reflexive understanding of marriage as only the union
of opposite-sex couples. The answer was determined by a Court exercising
reasoned judgment and by the Justices engaged in a generational and reflective
interpretation of due process “liberty.”
CONCLUSION
Obergefell is the latest iteration of the Justices’ debate over the analytical role
134. See id. at 2598.
135. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also id. at 2643 (“If a bare majority of Justices can invent a new right and impose that
right on the rest of the country, the only real limit on what future majorities will be able to do is their
own sense of what those with political power and cultural influence are willing to tolerate. Even
enthusiastic supporters of same-sex marriage should worry about the scope of the power that today’s
majority claims.”).
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that tradition and history do and should play in the Court’s substantive-dueprocess decision-making and jurisprudence. Both the majority and the dissenters
made interpretive and methodological choices, choices available to them as no
“particular approach to the Constitution” and to constitutional interpretation are
mandated by the document.140 Eschewing the use of Glucksberg’s traditionalist
methodology, the Obergefell majority proclaimed that in answering the question
of the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans, the past does not rule the
present.141 Accordingly, the right to marry a person of the same sex has now been
declared to be a fundamental right that cannot be denied by legislative acts
moored to deeply rooted history and tradition in which marriage is defined as
the union of one man and one woman. Obergefell thus teaches that the meaning
of the Due Process Clause’s liberty interest and principle is to be given operative
content by persons in every generation.

140. SUNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 43; see also id. at xv (“[I]nterpreters are free to adopt many
different approaches, while also remaining interpreters. The choice of approach is inescapably
ours.”); Cass R. Sunstein, There is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 193 (2015).
141. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.

